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PRESERVING DYNAMIC SYSTEMS:
WETLANDS, ECOLOGY AND LAW
ALYSON C. FLOURNOY*
Ecology has advanced human understanding of natural systems
considerably over the course of this century. Wetlands law and policy
have evolved in response to our increased understanding of wetlands
and the many benefits we derive from them.' As Americans learned
that wetlands were not noxious, valueless swamps needing "'reclama-
tion," the legal system changed to reflect our evolving values.2
Decades-old incentives for draining and filling wetlands were replaced
by regulations designed to preserve and enhance wetlands.
Notwithstanding this shift in policy and law, roughly fifty percent
of the wetlands that existed in the continental United States in
colonial times have been lost or degraded largely as a result of recent
human activity.' Although slowed somewhat in the last twenty years,
* Professor of Law, University of Florida College of Law. I am grateful to Doria
Gordon and Richard Hamann for discussing and reviewing this paper as it developed. Susan
Deprim provided valuable research assistance.
1. Wetlands perform valuable functions on which humans depend directly and
indirectly for a wide array of health, safety, aesthetic, economic and recreational benefits. Fish
and wildlife habitat, water supply, water quality, flood control, erosion and shoreline protection,
outdoor recreation opportunities,and education and research are among the benefits often
identified. MARK S. DENNISON & JAMES F. BERRY, WETLANDS: GUIDE TO SCIENCE, LAW,
AND TECHNOLOGY 55-63 (1993). Wetlands protect adjacent uplands by reducing flood size and
destructiveness, while simultaneously improving water quality through the natural absorption and
filtration processes they perform with respect to pollutants which could cause severe degradation
of rivers, lakes and estuaries. This filtration process is also directly connected to the quality of
water in aquifers which provide drinking water. Also, the importance of functioning wetlands
as they relate to land should not be overlooked. Wetlands bind stream banks and absorb wave
energy, thereby preventing erosion and stabilizing shorelines. They also play a role in land
formation in coastal areas that lose land to the ocean. WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, STATEWIDE
WETLANDS STRATEGIES: A GUIDE TO PROTECING AND MANAGING THE RESOURCE 4-6
(1992).
2. See Robert E. Beck, The Movement in the United States to Restoration and Creation
of Wetlands, 34 NAT. RESOURCES J. 781, 781 (1994).
3. See DENNISON & BERRY, supra note 1, at 67-70 (detailing figures on loss and
anthropogenic causes of loss).
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ongoing wetlands loss threatens to diminish or eliminate many of the
values we recognize in wetlands.'
Our current policies struggle to reconcile the goal of preventing
further loss with the pervasive concern for making our laws more
efficient. Any evaluation of exisiting law or prop6sals to change
existing law must therefore consider both regulatory effectiveness and
efficiency.5 Ecology can help us to answer these questions and to
design laws and policies that will achieve our goals.
This colloquium challenges us to consider the implications for
environmental law of one insight from ecology - the dynamic nature
of natural systems. This essay explores the lessons ecology offers us
about the efficacy of current wetlands regulation. Moving beyond the
basic insight that natural systems are dynamic, this essay introduces
a group of important corollary ideas that have achieved prominence
in ecology in recent years. These corollaries have emerged as keys to
understanding natural systems and their dynamic stability.6 In the
last two decades, ecologists have focused increasingly not just on the
fact of change, but on the importance of the processes,7 scale,8
4. Between 1954 and 1974, 95 million acres of wetlands were lost, averaging about
458,000 acres per year, with 396,000 of those resulting from conversion to agricultural uses. Id.
at 67. A 1991 national wetlands status report by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service estimated
the annual loss from the mid-1970's to the mid-1980's at 290,000 acres per year. WILLIAM L.
WANT, LAW OF WETLANDS REGULATION § 2.01[4], at 2-5 (1995). The 1992 National Resources
Inventory by the Natural Resources Conservation Service estimated wetlands loss on non-federal
lands from 1982-1992 at 70,000 - 90,000 acres per year, with 57% due to development and only
20% to agriculture. Ralph Heimlich & Jeanne Melanson, Wetlands Lost, Wetlands Gained,
NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. (Envt'l L. Inst., Wash., D.C.), May-June 1995, at 1, 23.
5. This is not to suggest that there is consensus on the precise degree of protection
we should seek in this field. In addition to concern with the efficiency of our laws, many
powerful voices are currently arguing simply for less regulation, regardless of its efficiency.
Nonetheless, there is widely shared concern over the pace of wetlands loss and widespread
recognition that wetlands serve important public interests and merit some degree of legal
protection. Current laws embody these basic premises. Since preservation of wetlands is one
of our goals, then the efficacy of our laws in achieving that goal, as well as their efficiency, are
important questions.
6. See Steward T.A. Pickett, et al., The New Paradigm in Ecology: Implications for
Conservation Biology Above the Species Level, in CONSERVATION BIOLOGY: THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF NATURE CONSERVATION, PRESERVATION AND MANAGEMENT 65 (Peggy L.
Fiedler & Subodh K. Jain eds., 1992); Judy L. Meyer, The Dance of Nature: New Concepts in
Ecology, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 875 (1994).
7. "To conserve systems effectively, conservation biologists must focus on process and
context." Pickett et al., supra note 6, at 74. Ecologists have highlighted the necessity of
preserving processes such as fire if we want to preserve a place or "object" that is part of a
natural system dependent on that process. So processes rather than objects or endpoints must
guide our policies if our goal is to conserve natural systems. Id. at 71, 74-77,
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pattern,9 reversibility, and unpredictability" of the change that
occurs in natural systems. This essay evaluates how well our wetlands
laws take account of these concepts.
Applying ecology's insights successfully to wetlands regulation
presents a particular challenge because most of our wetlands are in
private ownership. 2  The relevance of insights about dynamic
systems to public land management is more direct and obvious.3
8. The concept of scale includes both temporal and spatial hierarchical units, of
measurement or observation. See Reed F. Noss, Issues of Scale in Conservation Biology, in
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF NATURE CONSERVATION,
PRESERVATION AND MANAGEMENT 239, 242-244 (Peggy L. Fiedler and Subodh K. Jain eds.,
1992); See also Glossary, in CONSERVATION BIOLOGY: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
NATURE CONSERVATION, PRESERVATION, AND MANAGEMENT, supra, at 492. "The scale at
which Nature is viewed determines the patterns and processes detected . . .. Conservation
strategies.., will be most effective when they address ecological phenomena at multiple spatial
scales and levels of organization." Noss, supra, at 240, 243.
9. Ecologists studying patterns of change have developed the metaphor of patch
dynamics, which is defined as "continuous change in community structure and its species
abundances due to disturbance, creating shifting and mosaic patchiness." Glossary, supra note
8, at 492; see also Pickett et al., supra note 6, at 71-72.
10. Ecologists discuss the reversibility, of change in terms of a natural system's
resilience. "Resilience ... is the ability of a system to maintain its structure and patterns of
behavior in the face of disturbance." C.S. Holling, The Resilience of Terrestrial Ecosystems:
Local Surprise and Global Change, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BIOSPHERE 292,
296 (William C. Clark & R.E. Munn eds., 1986) (contrasting resilience with stability); see also
C.S. Holling, Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems, 4 ANN. REV. OF ECOLOGY &
SYSTEMATICS 1, 17 (1973); C.S. Holling, Engineering Resilience Versus Ecological Resilience, in
ENGINEERING WITHIN ECOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS 31, 32-35 (Peter C. Schulze ed., 1996). An
assessment of the impacts of human activity on a natural system such as a wetland should take
account of the resilience of the system.
11. "Surprise" is a central concept in the work being done by Holling and others to
theorize more productive institutional responses to change in natural systems. See C.S. Holling,
What Barriers? What Bridges?, in BARRIERS AND BRIDGES TO THE RENEWAL OF ECOSYSTEMS
AND INSTITUTIONS 3, 13-15 (Lance H. Gunderson et. al. eds., 1995).
12. One estimate is that seventy-four percent of the United States' remaining wetlands
are in private hands. See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, ENVIRONMENTAL TRENDS, 100 (1989), cited in Timothy D. Searchinger, Wetlands
Issues 1993: Challenges and A New Approach, 4 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 13, 43 n.106
(1993). The Endangered Species Act is another resource protection statute that seeks to
preserve a particular resource - species - found on both public and private lands.
13. This is not to suggest that there are not obstacles to the application of these
principles in the public land context. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., Adapting Environmental Law
to the Ecologists' Discovery of Disequiibria, 69 CHL-KENT L. REV. 887 (1994); Reed F. Noss,
Some Principles of Conservation Biology as They Apply to Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 893, 894
(1994) (noting "[ijf we are really interested in maintaining ecological processes and the services
they provide to human society, then conservation must be extended to entire landscapes or
regional ecosystems.") In other words, it may not be possible to apply these ecological
principles only on public lands alone.
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Ecology studies the systems that we consider "resources" in policy
and law. In public land management, where resource preservation is
one of our goals, ecology's insights are of direct relevance because
they aid in achieving that goal.
Yet resource management is not the model from which wetlands
law emerged. Wetlands regulation resembles pollution control more
than resource management. 4 Our laws typically authorize targeted
and reactive reponses to private activities, not the pervasive ongoing
management characteristic of public land law. Further, agencies are
granted very narrowly defined geographic authority over wetlands,
and regulate through permitting of proposed human activity. In this
context, taking account of what ecology tells about natural systems
and their complex patterns of change is more difficult.
This essay examines four defining characteristics of our current
approach to wetlands regulation that stand in tension with fundamen-
tal ecological insights: delineation, jurisdiction, case-by-case permit-
ting, and reliance on compensatory mitigation.'5 I do not suggest
that we abandon these useful concepts and tools. My goal is to
analyze how they stand in tension with what ecology tells us about
wetlands' dynamic stability. By identifying ways in which we may
currently be working at cross-purposes with nature, we can better
evaluate proposals to reform current law and make our laws more
effective and efficient. Each of the four characteristics presents us
with challenges but also opportunities for responding to the dynamic
reality of wetlands.
Part I of the essay explores wetlands delineation and the inherent
challenge of defining the bounds of a dynamic subject. Ecology tells
14. Modem wetlands regulation began under § 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of
1899, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1994), the purpose of which was to avoid impediments to navigation, a
goal more focused on avoiding degradation of waterways than on preserving wetlands as natural
resources. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994), carried forward the
general approach of § 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act by regulating "the discharge of dredged
or fill material" in "waters of the United States." 33 U.S.C. § 1344. In form, § 404 is a
permitting structure similar to the case-by-case permitting of other discharges of pollutants under
§ 402 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994). Permitting has been complemented in
recent years by regulatory initiatives such as the Advanced Identification of Wetlands Program
(ADID) and the Special Area Management Plan (SAMP), drawn originally from the Coastal
Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1451 (1994). See 40 C.F.R. § 230.80 (1995) (advanced
identification program); Robert Ceberio & Deborah Alaimo Lawlor, A Plan for the Beleaguered
Meadowlands, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. (Envt'l L. Inst., Wash., D.C.), July-Aug. 1995, at 10-13
(describing the development of a SAMP).
15. Unless otherwise indicated, regulation under § 404 of the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1344, is the focus of discussion.
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us that wetlands delineation should focus not only on rigid endpoints,
but also on ecological processes. However, because laws must also
operate efficiently and provide those affected adequate predictabili-
ty,'6 current delineation guidelines focus on endpoints rather than
processes. The law must struggle to maintain a proper balance.
Recent proposals to reform the regulatory criteria for delineation
ignore ecology's insights and move us back towards a view of
wetlands as static objects.
Part II addresses the related concept of regulatory jurisdiction.
The scope of regulatory action is currently confined to the geographic
boundary of each parcel identified as a wetland. This focus prevents
adequate attention to scale, patch dynamics and process, by ignoring
the interdependence of wetlands and uplands and the relationship
among different parcels of wetlands. Our jurisdictional boundaries
divert considerable resources to the perhaps impossible task of
delineating wetlands and make regulatory protection less effective.
Part III explores the limitations of case-by-case permitting as a
primary regulatory approach for protecting wetlands. This section
identifies features of permitting that are problematic from an
ecological perspective. To demonstrate how case-by-case permitting
frequently precludes regulators from incorporating consideration of
scale, resilience or surprise into their analysis, I contrast permitting
with an approach that incorporates regional or watershed planning.
Finally, Part IV examines the use of compensatory mitigation to
prevent net loss of wetlands. Current on-site mitigation practices
reveal insufficient attention to scale, patchiness, conservation of context
and processes. I will argue that off-site mitigation and mitigation
banking, when carefully designed, offer the potential to respond to
these shortcomings.
Perhaps the most important lesson that current ecological
thinking offers about wetlands regulation is that we cannot succeed in
our task of preserving natural systems like wetlands with a pure
pollution control, permitting approach. Wetlands are dynamic
resources that form part of larger landscapes and are sustained by
processes that extend beyond their bounds. To preserve wetlands, we
need regulatory approaches that protect these processes and land-
scapes. Such an approach demands that we consider more than
merely avoiding degradation of individual parcels. We must consider
16. See generally Carol Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV.
577 (1988).
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how a complex set of activities and circumstances directly and
indirectly affects wetlands processes. Accepting the inherent
shortcomings of our narrowly defined federal and state regulatory
jurisdiction, we can still move towards an ecologically sounder and
more efficient approach-.
I. DELINEATION
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and EPA define wetlands as:
Those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or
ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to
support, and that under normar circumstances do support, a
prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in
saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally include
swamps, marshes, bogs, and similar areas.'7
Wetlands vegetation, soil and hydrology are the three parameters that
are used to delineate wetlands."i The diagnostic environmental
characteristics of wetlands are hydrophytic vegetation, soils that are
hydric or associated with reducing soil conditions, and saturation
within 12 inches of the surface for at least seven consecutive days
during the growing season.' The 1987 Corps of Engineers Wetlands
Delineation Manual elaborates detailed indicators of these diagnostic
characteristics.' °  Although delineation of a wetland involves
discretionary judgments, the Corps requires a site to possess indicators
of all three characteristics in order to qualify as a wetland.
Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, the Corps of
Engineers and EPA regulate the discharge of dredged and fill
materials in the waters of the United States, including wetlands,
17. 33 C.F.R. § 328.6 (1995); see also DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, CORPS OF
ENGINEERS, WETLAND DELINEATION MANUAL (1987) [hereinafter 1987 'MANUAL].
18. 1987 MANUAL, supra note 17, 24, at 13. In its recent report, the National
Research Council criticizes the use of the term parameter in this context and, instead, describes
water, substrate and biota as factors to be assessed in identifying or delineating wetlands. NAT'L
RES. COUNCIL, WETLANDS: CHARACTERISTICS AND BOUNDARIES 64 (1995).
19. 1987 MANUAL, supra note 17, 26b, at 13.
20. Id. 35, at 44-45, 49. Hydrophytic vegetation is indicated when more than fifty
percent of the dominant species are obligate, facultative wetland or facultative. Id. I 35a, at 19,
23. Hydric soil indicators include histosols, histic epipedons, sulfidic material, and gleyed soils,
among others. Id. lI 44, at 30-31. Recorded dta, field data, watermarks, draft lines, sediment
deposits, and drainage patterns indicate wetlands hydrology. Id. 49, at 36-41.
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WETLANDS, ECOLOGY AND LAW
through a permitting process. The landward extent of these agencies'
jurisdictional authority is defined by the boundaries of what are
determined to be wetlands.21 Thus delineation determines the
boundaries of the areas covered by the 404 permitting process.
Because the delineation criteria define the reach of federal regulatory
jurisdiction, they are subject to nearly continuous scrutiny. As a
result, over the past ten years We have experienced a series of
controversies over the appropriate delineation method to govern
federal agency decisions, It is against this background that the
challenges and limitations of current delineation must be examined.
A. Designing Delineation Criteria for Dynamic Systems
There is no universally agreeable set of criteria for identifying
what we call wetlands. Because wetlands are dynamic, ecologists look
to processes and functions, not endpoints, as the keys to identifica-
tion.' But to enable permitting agencies to rule on landowners'
permit requests, the law must be clear, produce consistent results, and
resolve this important jurisdictional question for any piece of land at
a given moment.
21. Some have criticized the inherent blurring of science and policy in this approach,
which uses science to define the bounds of agency authority. See Jess J. Franco, Real Reform
for Section 404, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWsL. (Envt'l L. Inst., Wash., D.C.), Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 12,
14 (advocating that science be used to delineate wetlands and a separate policy decision be made
on how far to extend regulatory jurisdiction).
22. The major events in this ongoing battle are described very briefly below. In 1987,
the Corps and EPA each adopted independent delineation manuals. In 1989, in the wake of the
National Wetland Policy Forum, EPA, the Corps and other agencies cooperated to produce a
joint manual, known as the FEDERAL MANUAL FOR IDENTIFYING AND DELINEATING
JURISDICTIONAL WETLANDS (1989). [hereinafter 1989 Manual]. The 1989 Manual provoked
criticism from developers, agricultural interests and other landowners for its complexity, its
arguable expansion of the scope of jurisdiction, and the agencies' failure to solicit public
comment in its preparation. In response to this criticism, the White House, OMB, and the
Council on Competitiveness, headed by then-Vice President Quayle, produced a 1991 proposed
revision to the Manual. The 1991 Manual provoked massive outcry from the scientific
community and environmentalists for its lack of scientific grounding and its projected impact.
Field tests projected that the application of the 1991 revisions would exclude some thirty to
eighty percent of the lands previously delineated as wetlands.
In the wake of the furor over the proposed revisions, Congress mandated the Corps to
return to its 1987 Manual and directed the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to prepare a
report on the scientific standards for delineation. This Report was published by the National
Research Council in May 1995, shortly before the House voted on H.R. 961,104th Cong. (1995).
NAT'L RES. CoUNCIL, supra note 18, at 1-3.
23. NAT'L RES. CouNCIL, supra note 18, at 35-42.
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In the quest for a relatively simple, certain definition, agencies
assess fixed quantifiable endpoints24 rather than attempting a full
assessment of wetland processes or functions as a practical necessi-
ty.' Ideally, these endpoints are surrogates that indicate a function-
ing wetland. The difficulty arises because there is an imperfect
correlation between these indicators' presence and the existence of
wetlands processes or functions. 6 Determining hydrologic function
can be especially difficult. Although hydrology is central to wetlands,
hydrologic indicators are unreliable and often difficult to access and
measure.
2 7
The more narrowly we define these positive indicators, the less
variability among wetland types the standard accommodates. If
defined too narrowly, these endpoints limit the delineator's ability to
take account of the natural changes in wetland water levels and
vegetation from year to year and season to season. For example,
requiring a set number of days of saturation at a specified level may
prevent a site from qualifying as a jurisdictional wetland, even if it
performs wetland functions. A more contextual, process-focused
methodology, which considers the same site's relative wetness and
location in -the landscape, might lead to inclusion of the area' as a
wetland.' Wetlands that display infrequent function (on the order
24. Quantified endpoints, such as vegetation or hydrology, are the indicators relied on,
as surrogates, for identifying wetlands presence. For example, greater than fifty percent
vegetation of certain types and seven or more days of saturation within one foot of the surface
are endpoints which are used in concluding that an area is a wetland.
25. The contrast between clear quantifiable endpoints and muddier contextual
assessments of function is in some ways similar to the "crystals and mud" dialectic in property
rules that Professor Carol Rose describes. See generally Rose, supra note 16.
26. For example, the National Academy of Science commented in its recent report on
delineation that "[d]isturbance of the biota or substrate can produce a wetland in which the
characteristic substrates or organisms are absent, at least temporarily." NAT'L RES. COUNCIL,
supra note 18, at 4.
27. Id
28. See Jon Kusler, Wetlands Delineation:An Issue ofScience or Politics, ENV'r, March
1992, at 7, 30-31. One of many sources of criticism of the proposed 1991 revisions to the Manual
was that the indicators selected failed to correlate to wetlands functions. See id. at 35.
Selection of positive indicators of wetlands hydrology has proved particularly
controversial in the war over delineation manuals. The depth at which water must be present,
the duration of saturation or inundation, and the period during which the indicationis found are
among the areas of dispute. See, eg., Joy B. Zedler, Reinventing Wetland Science, NAT'L
WETLANDS NEWSL, July-Aug. 1995, at 1, 17-18 (criticizing the criteria employed in H.R. 961,
104th Cong. (1995), and contrasting them with those developed by the National Research
Council in May, 1995); Searchinger, supra note 12, at 27-29 (detailing how reliance on
quantifiable indicators of saturation to prove wetland hydrology excludes many areas that
perform valuable wetland functions.) Moreover, regional variation in hydrology may exist which
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of five to ten years) or rare function (fifty to one hundred years) are
usually excluded by current regulatory definitions. The 1987 Manual
mediates between certainty and ease of administration on the one
hand, and ecological integrity on the other, by requiring one positive
wetla'nd indicator from each of the three parameters, while providing
ertain exceptions to temper this rigidity. The indicator for wetlands
hydrology requires saturation twelve inches below the surface, but it
does not provide any minimum duration.
Legislative proposals in the 104th Congress have resurrected
fairly rigid delineation 'criteria drawn from the 1991 proposed
revisions to the Delineation Manual.29 Senate Bill 851 mandates that
lands be delineated as wetland if they meet two criteria." The first
criterion is "clear evidence" of wetlands hydrology, hydrophytic
vegetation and hydric soils at the time of delineation. Although
obligate wetland vegetation during the period of delineation would
provide clear evidence of hydrophytic vegetation, facultative vegeta-
tion (i.e. vegetation equally adapted to wet or dry soil conditions)
would not.31 The second criterion requires water "on or above the
surface of the ground for at least twenty-one consecutive days during
the growing season in a year of normal rainfall."32 The bill also
allows the applicant to elect the timing of the delineation.33
These provisions of S. 851 narrow the indicators of wetlands
hydrology and vegetation and thus the range of variability among
areas that qualify for protection. The focus on rigid and narrow
cannot be easily accounted for in a single regulatory definition. See Zedler, supra, at 18.
29. See supra note 22.
30. See S. 851, 104th Cong. § 3(e)(1)(B) (1995). From the language of the bill, it is
not clear whether these two criteria are intended to be exclusive or not. It is possible to
interpret this language to mean that areas meeting the criteria in the statute must be included
within the definition of wetlands, but without precluding the Corps from also including other
areas within the definition of wetlands. H.R. 961, 104th Cong. (1995), while similar to S. 851
in the criteria it imposes, makes clear that no area shall be delineated as a wetland unless it
meets the statutory criteria. See H.R. 961, § 803(g)(1)(A). The House Bill also differs from the
Senate Bill in that it makes no mention of the NAS study. Id. The Senate Bill directs the Corps
to "consider" the NAS study in developing mandatory delineation regulations. S. 851,
§ 3(e)(1)(A).
31. See S. 851, § 3(e)(1)(C)(ii).
32. S. 851, § 3(e)(1)(B)(ii). An alternate test is provided for tidal wetlands and
temporarily created wetlands. House Bill 961 requires that the 21 days of saturation at the
surface be demonstrated for the majority of years for which there are records available. See
H.R. 961, § 803(c). This is an improvement over some recent bills that would have made surface
saturation during the year of delineation essential.
33. See S. 851, § 3(e)(1)(B)(i).
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endpoints moves us away from an ecological approach, because it is
disconnected from consideration of wetland function.34 For example,
requiring 21 days of standing water fails to account for the impact of
events or conditions such as drought or groundwater pumping which
may change the hydrology of a wetland temporarily." As a result,
areas which ecologists consider wetlands are only protected within a
narrow range of variabilit. The direction of proposed federal reform
is to deny the dynamic nature of the system and to cabin its definition
beyond where ecologists have. Such action may be defended as a
policy choice, but it is a fairly dramatic one. It sacrifices scientific
coherence in order to crudely narrow federal jurisdiction. A cautious,
science-based approach would counsel some technical evaluation of
the impacts before excluding a wide array of wetlands associated with
recognized functions.
B. Picturing Wetlands Across Time: Delineation as Snapshot
Like other natural systems, wetlands can form and disappear
without human involvement, adding to and subtracting from the
existing mosaic. Under current and proposed delineation policy and
law, agency jurisdiction extends only to certain areas that possess
wetlands soil, hydrology and vegetation at the time of delineation.
3 6
The limited scope of what we delineate as wetlands may reflect a
conscious policy choice to subject to regulation only that land which
presently maintains a certain profile of wetland characteristics.
Alternatively, the law's exclusive focus on existing wetlands might
reflect the difficulty - or even impossibility - of constructing a test
to predict which areas might become wetlands over some longer time
horizon. Or the shape of our laws and policies may reflect a simple
failure to recognize the dynamic nature of these systems. Whatever
the reason, the result is a regulatory regime which protects current
34. Perhaps the twenty-one-day requirement can be explained as reflecting a lay
instinct that a wetland should be soggy at the surface. Or the twenty-one days may simply be
intended as a crude device to narrow regulatory jurisdiction. The validity of this and earlier
similar proposals have been repeatedly challenged by the scientific community. See, e.g., Kusler,
supra note 28, at 34-35.
35. See Searchinger, supra note 12, at 27 (describing the political motivation for the
compromise of including only "wet" wetlands in the 1993 bills and its inconsistency with
preserving desired wetland functions such as flood control and filtration).
36. See supra notes 17-35 and accompanying text.
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wetlands and does not explicitly acknowledge or account for natural
change in these systems.
This shortcoming in the present regulatory scheme is significant
because it conceals the fact that our actual rate of wetlands loss may
be higher than we acknowledge. In addition to losing existing
wetlands to human activity, we may be stifling the slow natural
process of wetland creation. For example, in coastal areas, we have
discovered that wetlands lost to hurricanes, storms, or erosion often
cannot re-form at the new coastline, because the adjacent areas that
might naturally have become wetlands in response to these natural
processes are already paved or otherwise developed. In this situation,
the dynamic that naturally both added and subtracted wetlands now
produces only loss. Thus, the loss of uplands becomes irreversible
local net loss.
Of course, the inverse proposition is also true: some areas that we
lose to human activity would have disappeared naturally over time.
Some human-induced loss removes only wetlands that would
eventually disappear.37 In order to accurately assess the relative
human impact on wetlands formation and loss, we must consider the
rates of natural creation and loss of wetlands and compare these with
the rates of anthropogenic impacts.
Wetlands are sometimes lost quickly, even without human
intervention. An earthquake or volcanic eruption may destroy some
wetlands over a short time horizon. But this is a relatively rare and
spatially limited occurrence. Larger scale changes in the landscape
occur over geologic time frames of centuries to millennia." Human
intervention, by contrast, aided by technology, has moved both
quickly and pervasively across the landscape, yielding massive net loss
of existing wetlands as well as uplands that might have become
wetlands. We have accomplished rapid and widespread change over
a span of years or decades.39 The very different temporal and spatial
37. This insight might lead some to question any effort to protect a natural area,
including wetlands, since the area might disappear or be altered without human intervention.
Such a response is misguided. The insight that wetlands are dynamic must be applied with a
sensitivity to scale, both spatial and temporal. Only then does it improve our understanding of
natural systems and the implications of human activity in these systems.
38. For example, some 5000 years ago, the area known today as the Everglades was
dominated by oak savanna. See C.S. Holling et al., The Structure and Dynamics of the
Everglades System: Guidelines for Ecosystem Restoration, in EVERGLADES: THE ECOSYSTEM
AND ITS RESTORATION 741 (Steven M. Davis & John C. Ogden eds., 1994).
39. See supra note 4. In addition to direct activities in wetlands, human activities'
indirect effects are leading to further loss of wetlands. DENNISON & BERRY, supra note 1, at
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scales at which.wetlands and uplands are lost with and without human
intervention suggests that natural processes of creation and loss of
wetlands are both dampened and dwarfed by human intervention in
these systems.
Ultimately, then, the awareness that wetlands are dynamic is a
humbling lesson, highlighting the relatively dramatic pace of anthro-
pogenic change. Our pattern of destruction of wetlands overshadows
naturally-occurring loss and may obliterate long-term natural
formation. While this may not counsel any change in our regulatory
definition, it may help us to determine how much human activity is
altering the landscape irreversibly and prompt us to reconsider the
meaning of "net loss."
II. JURISDICTION: SINGLING OUT WETLANDS
Perhaps the most dramatic lesson from reviewing wetlands
regulation through an ecological lens is not what its contours contain,
but, what falls outside the scope of regulatory concern. Our laws
provide almost no protection for uplands. The arbitrary boundary we
draw around wetlands confounds efforts to incorporate ecology into
regulatory decisions. This section examines in greater detail two
ecological deficiencies in a regulatory approach that focuses heavily
on wetlands to the exclusion of uplands and other elements of the
landscape. Part A describes how the current approach ignores the
interdependence among the species and the processes found in
different types of habitat. If we protect only the wetland as object,
rather than the matrix of habitats that contribute to wetland process-
es, we may in fact fail to protect the wetland. Part B explains how
singling out wetlands for protection prevents us from taking advantage
69-70. Human depletion of groundwater tables has already caused noticeable impacts on
Wetlands in some regions, unaccounted for by any permitting process, with no compensating
creation. The Executive Director of the South West Florida Water Management District
(SWFWMD), for example, has recognized the "connection between groundwater pumping and
the drying of wetlands and lakes across Pasco County." Quoted in Jeffrey Brainard, Are the
Lakes Half Full or Half Empty?, PASCO TIMES, Nov. 12, 1995, at 1. SWFWMD has proposed
to deny renewal of the permits allowing groundwater pumping by central supply system
wellfields serving the city of St. Petersburg and Pinellas County, based on its determination that
groundwater pumping impacted the hydroperiods of wetlands and surface waters and could
result in significant harm to water resources. A challenge to the proposed permit denial is
pending. See West Coast Regional Water Supply Authority et al., Petitioners v. SWFWMD,
Respondent, Thomas W. Reese et al., Intervenom, Case Nos. 95-1520 to 95-1529 (State of Fla,
Dept. of Admin. Hearings).
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of what ecologists have come to understand about scale. Regulatory
jurisdiction that ends at the edge of each patch of wetlands fails to
provide sufficient authority to take account of patch dynamics and
conservation of context. This section concludes with ,discussion of
some promising regulatory tools which can alleviate these deficiencies.
A. The Interdependence of Uplands and Wetlands
Areas outside jurisdictional wetlands may be vital to the
processes on which functioning wetlands depend. If we protect only
wetlands, we are not assuring continued ecosystem function. A recent
case study of wetland species illustrates this point.' The case study
involved freshwater turtles and their dependence on upland buffer
zones for the successful completion of their life cycles.4' The gravid
mud turtles studied spend most of their lives in the federally protected
wetland areas of Ellenton Bay, South Carolina.42 The hibernation
and nesting cycles of the turtles are conducted completely upon
adjacent uplands.43 The study found that no turtle nesting areas fell
within the delineated wetlands." Even adding a 30.5 meter uplands
buffer zone protected by some states, only 44% of the nests .and
hibernation sites of this turtle species would be protected. To
provide protection for 90% of the sites, a 73 meter buffer zone is
required, and in order to fully protect the sites, a 275 meter buffer
zone is required.46
This study demonstrates that neither federal nor state wetland
ptotection schemes take into consideration the total terrestrial needs
of wetland species' when delineating protected areas. The authors of
40. See Vincent J. Burke & J. Whitfield Gibbons, Terrestrial Buffer Zones and Wetland
Conservation: A Case Study of Freshwater Turtles in a Carolina Bay, 9 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY
1365 (1995). Although § 404 of the Clean Water Act and many state laws purport to focus on
wetland function, rather than species or biodiversity protection, ecologists recognize the
relationships that exist between biological diversity and ecosystem function. These relationships
are complex and operate at many temporal and spatial scales. See Paul G. Risser, Biodiversity
and Ecosystem Function, 9 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 742,745 (1995). Therefore, if current laW
fails to provide meaningful protection for the biological diversity of wetlands, the law's ability
to assure ecosystem function may be fatally flawed.
41. See Burke & Gibbons, supra note 40, at 1365-69.
42. See id.'at 1367
43. See id.
44. See id. at 1368.
45. See id.
46. See id-
Fall 1996]
DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM
the case study note "the futility of preserving one component of an
integrated landscape."'47 In other words, if we want to preserve
functioning wetlands, ultimately, we must also protect uplands.
The study illustrates the importance of what Pickett et al. call
"conservation of context."4 If our goal is to protect processes found
in wetlands, we must consider their dependence on adjoining non-
wetland habitat. Under a regulatory system that provides almost no
authority over non-wetland habitat, our efforts are compromised in
the same way that we have come to realize our efforts in protected
areas like parks' are compromised. Nature doesn't share our
jurisdictional boundaries and doesn't allow us to fence off wetlands as
self-sufficient sanctuaries.
B. Scale, Patchiness and the Conservation of Context
Singling out wetlands also inhibits regulators' ability to assess the
impacts of activities in wetlands at appropriate scales. Ecologists have
learned to think across spatial and temporal scales in evaluating the
history and future of ecosystems. 49 Focusing only on wetlands may
not allow us to see the larger processes - natural and anthropogenic
- at work in the landscape.5 ° Thus our permitting decisions may
ignore important processes operating at scales which necessarily
encompass more than just wetlands. These overlooked processes may
ultimately determine whether wetlands permitting decisions effectively
and adequately achieve our stated policies.51 Ecologically-informed
thinking demands attention to multiple scales of activity and change,
both spatial and temporal, to ensure that all relevant patterns and
relationships are observed.52
To act with an awareness of scale, one would complement
assessment of the impacts of activity in wetlands with analysis of the
mosaic of habitat within which wetlands exist. Patch dynamics
teaches that it's not just acreage of wetlands but this mosaic of habitat
that ve. should be concerned with preserving. We need to be more
47. See id.
48. Pickett et al., supra note 6, at 77-79, 84.
49. See Hoiling, supra note 11, at 17-18.
50. See Pickett et al., supra note 6, at 71.
51. See Holling, supra note 11, at 23-24.
52. Holing and others have developed the concept of "nested hierarchies" to explain
the asymmetric relationship that exists among natural cycles in a single system viewed at
diffirent scales. See Holling et aL, supra note 38, at 748-751; Holling, supra note 11, at 20.25.
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attentive not only to distribution of the remaining wetlands across the
landscape but also to the matrix of uplands and wetlands as a whole,
viewed at a variety of scales. Conservation of a larger matrix might
also more frequently allow for conservation of a wider range of
wetland types than are recognized and protected by the law. The
need for "conservation of context" and a mosaic of habitats to
successfully conserve natural systems is not well served by a program
that limits regulatory interest and control to areas designated as
wetlands.
However desirable from an ecological standpoint, an expansion
of regulatory jurisdiction to enable consideration of the matrix of
uplands and wetlands seems extremely unlikely. Not only political
but also constitutional objections would likely defeat any legislative
effort to expand federal jurisdiction to encompass uplands.53 But
even under existing law, there are some opportunities to take account
of a broader matrix of habitats and to make decisions at a variety of
scales.
53. The political objections can be inferred from ongoing efforts to restrict federal
jurisdiction over wetlands and to eliminate restrictions on private property under the
Endangered Species Act. See, eg., Kenneth R. Harney, Property Protection Proposal Offers
Compensation for Federal Restrictions that Devalue Private Property, WASH. POST, July 20,1996,
at E3; H. Sterling Burnett, Endangered Property, WASH. TIMES, June 19, 1996, at A19. The
recent wave of state takings statutes echoes this political hostility to regulation that restricts
private uses of lands. See generally Jerome M. Organ, Understanding State and Federal Property
Rights Legislation, 48 OKLA. L. REV. 191 (1995) (surveying these developments).
Objections to expanded federal jurisdiction over privately owned land also likely include
the constitutional bounds of federal legislative authority. In the recent decision in United States
v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995), the Supreme Court made clear that even the expansive
Commerce Clause has limits. And the commerce clause justification for federal regulation of
isolated wetlands has been recently challenged, albeit unsuccessfully. See Hoffman Homes, Inc.
v. EPA, 961 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding EPA's assertion of jurisdiction over isolated
wetlands exceeded authority under the Clean Water Act; rejecting theory that presence or
potential presence of wildlife satisfies the Commerce Clause; and finding inadequate evidence
connecting the isolated wetland to human economic activity under the Commerce Clause); reh'g
granted and opinion vacated, 975 F.2d 1554 (7th Cir. 1992); 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993)
(upholding EPA's interpretation of its regulation basing jurisdiction on minimal and potential
impacts on interstate commerce, but finding EPA's conclusion that the isolated wetlands in
question were suitable for migratory bird habitat to be unsupported by substantial evidence on
the record as a whole). So although there are cogent arguments for expanded federal
jurisdiction, my point here is to suggest that advocating such an expansion today is not likely to
meet with success.
Fall 1996]
DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM
C. Promising Regulatory Tools
For large development projects or areas of intense development,
regulatory coordination under existing wetlands and endangered
species laws can lead to better ecological outcomes.' Mitigation of
wetlands and protection of wetland and upland species, when
addressed together, can provide an opportunity to preserve not just
wetlands but a matrix of uplands and wetlands.
The Disney Wilderness Preserve exemplifies this possibility.55
'his preserve was developed as mitigation for the permits associated
with Disney's twenty-year build-out plan, which entails alteration of
roughly 340 acres of wetlands. To mitigate its impact on these
wetlands, Disney agreed to purchase and restore a large tract that the
state had identified as important conservation land. The area selected
for purchase and preservation, the 8500 acre Walker Ranch, had been
seriously altered by cattle ranching and other activities, but retained
high value as a, matrix of uninterrupted uplands and wetlands
providing habitat for a range of important species. 6  Under the
terms of its permit, Disney must restore wetlands on the property, in
exchange for wetlands mitigation credit. Associated uplands and
threatened and endangered species' habitat destrution will be
mitigated on the same site through upland restoration and protection
measures. Through coordinated action, the agencies involved - the
Corps of Engineers, the Florida Department of Environmental
Protection (DEP), the South Florida Water Management District, and
54. Some advances have been made under species protection laws to move beyond
single species protection. Habitat Conservation Planning (HCP) under the Endangered Species
Act has provided a framework for agreements that may provide protection for more than just
a single species. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2) (1994). Although the statute does not explicitly
provide for multi-species conservation plans, experience in regional habitat conservation
planning has demonstrated that this is sometimes a useful approach or a valuable by-product of
the HCP effort. For a description of the Balcones Canyonland plan, see J.B. Ruhl, Regional
Habitat Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act: Pushing the Legal and
Practical Limits of Species Protection, 44 SW. L. J. 1393 (1991). California's Natural Community
Conservation Planning has institutionalized a framework for protection of natural communities
rather than single species. See Robert Reinhold, Tiny Songbird Poies Big Test for U.S.
Environmental Policy, N.Y. TIMES, March 16, 1993, at Al.
55. For a good discussion of this project, see Steve Gatewood, Disney Banks on
Mitigation, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL (Envt'l L. Inst., Wash., D.C.), Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 7. Mr.
Gatewood was the Project Director of The Nature Conservancy's Disney Wilderness Preserve.
56. The Nature Conservancy and Disney developed a restoration and management
plan which the agencies approved and the environmental community supported. Under contract,
The Nature Conservancy is managing the restoration, undertaking extensive research and
monitoring, and will hold title to the land subject to a conservation easement.
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the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission - will effective-
ly protect both wetlands and uplands, in a matrix that should preserve
the resilience of the entire tract.
This model worked in part because of the size of Disney's
development and the associated loss of several hundred acres of
wetlands over the twenty-year period. The high value of the on-site
land contributed to making the off-site mitigation financially attractive
to Disney. Also, the broad consensus on the ecological value of this
single, large, contiguous area in single ownership simplified the
process of crafting and implementing an agreement considerably.
Nonetheless, the Disney Preserve stands as a valuable example: both
for large development projects and where off-site mitigation is
desirable or necessary, the preservation of a matrix of habitats is a
possibility that can be explored.
In the context of smaller, more conventional permits, broadening
our focus beyond wetlands is more difficult. One strategy involves
greater use of existing state and local land use authority to control
impacts to a broad range of natural values. Better integration of a
wide array of conservation concerns into local land use planning is a
first step. State comprehensive planning, where it exists, often
provides the opportunity to take a landscape perspective.
Unfortunately, local elected officials may have strong political
motivation to deemphasize controversial conservation issues in land
use decisions. Moreover, the existence of any federal regulatory
involvement, even if not preemptive of local control, may discourage
local regulation under the superficial (but frequently expressed) view
that such additional regulation is duplicative and inefficient. While an
additional level of regulation does entail additional costs, regulation
at different scales can be effectively coordinated and may be
essential.57 The ongoing importance of federal wetland permitting
as a context for evaluating and debating ecological impacts of land use
projects suggests that these local planning efforts have not adequately
57. Attention to protection of natural values at the local level may not only be a
logical choice, it may be an institutional imperative if we are to make sound decisions. Applying
the new insights of ecology to the design of governance systems, Elinor Ostrom has noted the
historic success of governance systems that mirror the complexity of the natural systems through
organization at multiple scales. "[I]f complexity is the nature of the systems we have an interest
in governing (regulating), it is essentialto think seriously about the complexity in the governance
systems that are proposed." Elinor Ostrom, Designing Complexity to Govern Complexity, in
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 33,34 (Susan Hanna and Mohan Munasinghe eds.,
1995).
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addressed these concerns to date.. Financial constraints and the
limited ability of local governments to evaluate and act on patterns
that extend beyond municipal or county boundaries present challenges
for local governments seeking to incorporate a broad range, of
ecological concerns into land use decisions. Coordination between
local governments and state agencies or regional entities, such as
Florida's five water management districts, offer perhaps the most
promising institutional avenue for integrating non-wetland values and
regulatory control. However, such entities need a mandate from the
state to extend regulatory control to uplands in a systematic fash-
ion.58
The current tenor of debate about the extent of private property
rights and the larger-than-life shadow now cast by the Fifth Amend-
ment suggest that expanded regulation of land use by state or federal
government would be greeted with strong opposition today.5 9  The
recent rash of state laws expanding the scope of property rights'
often increase the cost of any such effort.61 Nonetheless, polls
58. Some state and regional entities already exercise authority to protect both uplands
and wetlands, beyond protecting endangered or threatened species and their habitat, but
regulatory authority over activity in privately owned uplands is rare. For example, Florida's five
water management districts have authority to acquire uplands in connection with their overall
water quality protection mandate under both Preservation 2000 and the Save Our Rivers
Program. Preservation 2000 sets forth criteria for land acquisition when "threat of development"
endangers Wetlands. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 259.101(2)(c) (West 1991 & Supp. 1997). This
authorization grants broad authority to acquire wetlands and the uplands which function as
buffer zones for the adequate protection of the wetland ecosystems. Under the Save Our Rivers
Program of the Water Management Districts, water supply protection, recharge protection,
natural systems protection, and recreation are all grounds that justify land acquisition, including
uplands.
59. The just compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment provides "nor shall private
property be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Although
recent decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court have not expanded the scope of the takings doctrine
significantly, see Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Dolan v. City
of Tisgard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), they have heightened state and local governments' awareness
of the cost of unintentional takings.
60. See Organ, supra note 53, for a discussion of recent state "property rights" or
takings laws.
61. Although not often discussed, our current wetlands- and endangered species-
focused approach may engender at least some political opposition that a broader approach
would not. Because only those landowners whose properties contain wetlands or endangered
species are subject to federal land use regulation, challenges to the legitimacy of these regulatory
programs based on the perceived inequity carry some moral force. Property rights advocates
frequently emphasize this "singling out" and the unevenness of the burden. Even the
constitutional standard for determining whether property has been taken focuses on this factor
- whether an individual has been singled out to carry more than her fair share of the burden
to achieve some broader common purpose. A broader regulatory program reaching land uses
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consistently show strong public support for environmental protection.
Ultimately, a public better educated in what ecology tells us- about
how to achieve environmental protection may be the key to a more
integrated approach.
III. THE LIMITATIONS OF PERMITTING WITHOUT PLANNING
A third characteristic of current regulatory approaches at odds
with ecology is the traditional reliance on permitting to accomplish
wetlands preservation and the relatively minor role of watershed
planning.62 Case-by-case permitting, standing alone, cannot ade-
quately incorporate the ecological lessons of scale, resilience, and
surprise, because it deprives regulators the opportunity to make
decisions that account for regional- and landscape-scale concerns.
63
As noted above, ecologists are paying increasing attention to
natural processes at a range of different scales. To observe the effects
of some of these processes, agencies must collect information which
cannot ordinarily be obtained in case-by-case permitting decisions.
But even if they could collect this information, agencies lack the
authority to systematically incorporate it into their regulatory
decisions.' Individual permit determinations generally provide an
inadequate context for consideration of patch dynamics. Absent some
broader planning context, a decision on an individual permit is
unlikely to provide regulators the information and flexibility to
effectively preserve an appropriate mosaic of uplands and wet-
lands.65
that affect a broader range of essential ecological processes, although still likely to generate
enormous political opposition for economic and other philosophical reasons, could address this
fairness concern.
62. Permitting is not the sum of current regulatory efforts, but it is the mainstay of the
regulatory program. See supra note 14 (discussing use of SAMPs and ADID by EPA) and supra
note 58 (discussing some of the state and local programs that supplement permitting with
planning).
63. See Joy B. Zedler, Reinventing Wetland Science, 17 NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL
(Envt'l L. Inst., Wash., D.C.), July-Aug. 1995, at 1, 20.
64. The Corps and EPA are limited by the bounds of delineated wetlands. Although,
in theory, their national jurisdiction provides them the authority to consider regional and
landscape scale concerns, this does not appear to be their practice. Searchinger, supra note 12,
at 58-59, outlines a proposal for watershed planning for wetland protection.
65. But see 33 U.S.C. § 320.4(b)(3) (1994) (dictating consideration of cumulative
impacts of activities in the area in consultation with representatives of other federal agencies).
Critics have pointed out that the Corps has failed to develop a system to collect the necessary
information for such an assessment. See Searchinger, supra note 12, at 40, 42.
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,When individual permitting decisions are made without an
adequate planning framework, wetlands thought to be preserved may
be put at risk. The cumulative effect of a series of decisions in a
watershed may affect the resilience66 of the wetlands in that area,-
that is, their long-term ability to recover from degradation. Unless
regulators monitor and evaluate feedback at the appropriate scales
and attend to impacts on the resilience of natural systems, they run
the demonstrated risk of persistent and irreversible degradation.
In his recent article in Barriers and Bridges to the Renewal of
Ecosystems and Institutions by Gunderson et al., Holling studied the
natural workings of complex evolving systems. They observe that
human attempts "to manage ecological variables... inexorably led to
less resilient ecosystems."'67 Failure to observe or consider change
occurring at all relevant scales contributed to loss of resilience in the
systems. Holling's observation about the pattern of human interven-
tion in natural systems seems applicable to both resource management
and regulatory decisionmaking. Agencies tolerate or pursue change
in systems but then fail to observe all impacts except those they
anticipated in defining the goals of the intervention. In a series of
wetland permitting decisions, EPA or the Corps may evaluate
projected impacts on water quality, without monitoring to determine
how previously-issued permits in the watershed have affected the
distribution of wetlands across the landscape. 8  Long-term or
broader-scale changes to the health and distribution of wetland-
dependent species or to wetland functions may go unnoticed. Yet
these unobserved changes may be significant, and can lead to systems
"more likely to flip into a persistent degraded state, triggered by
disturbance that previously could be absorbed.169
In the case of wetlands "preserved" within a matrix of intensive
development, the likelihood of loss of resilience seems even higher
than in a large geographic area being managed as a natural resource.
Consider a developer seeking a permit to fill wetlands under the
66. "Resilience determines the persistence of relationships within a system and is a
measure of the ability of these systems to absorb changes of state variables, driving variables,
and parameters, and still persist." C.S. Holling, Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems,
4 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY & SYSTEMATICS 1, 17 (1973).
67. Holling, supra note 11, at 6.
68. See Searchinger, supra note 12, at 40, 42; Zedler, supra note 28, at 20 (discussing
how loss of one type of wetland in a migratory flyway may affect the function of the entire
flyway).
69.. See Searchinger, supra note 12, at 8.
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current permitting regime. Even if the permit to fill is denied, ° the
developer may proceed to develop all the adjacent upland areas, as
long as she avoids development in the wetlands. So even under the
most protective regulatory option, chances are good that a substantial
portion of the "saved" wetlands will be significantly degraded because
of the loss of ecological context. The wetland as object will remain
for some time, but the functions and values associated with it may be
severely degraded or, in some cases, completely lost.7'
Another constraint of permitting, standing alone, is that it fails
to allow integrated consideration of activities outside the wetlands
that may have a significant impact on the wetlands, such as decisions
to alter river flows or pump groundwater. These decisions may
compound shortcomings in the wetlands permit process. 72  For
example, decisions to alter river flows and suppress the natural
variations in the timing and quantity of flows for human purposes73
affect not only the rivers but also other habitats hydrologically
connected to the river, including wetlands. Ecologists caution us that
our attempts to control the variability of these systems will ultimately
be thwarted by surprises, like the five hundred year floods along the
Mississippi River. The loss of resilience in the affected areas makes
the impacts of such an event all the more dramatic.
The inadequacies of case-by-case permitting discussed above
warrant our attention. As long as we overlook considerations of scale
and resilience, we are sure to lose even those wetlands we congratu-
late ourselves for preserving. Cost is likely the biggest obstacle to
developing regularized planning with greater attention to resilience
and scald. But the short-term costs associated with regulatory
planning must be weighed against the costly mistakes that case-by-
70. This occurs in a very small percentage of applications, less than 1 percent in 1994.
See Michael L. Davis, A More Effective and Flexible Section 404, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL
(Envt'l L. Inst., Wash., D.C.), July-Aug. 1995, at 7, 9.
71. Habitat values and functions may be lessened or destroyed by the surrounding
development. See Douglas L. Lashley, Guiding Mitigation Banking, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL
(Envt'l L. Inst., Wash., D.C.), Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 17, 20. The wetland may still enhance water
quality but pollutants from the adjacent development may offset this remaining value. Clearing
of native vegetation in adjacent areas may reduce opportunities for recruitment and reduce the
viability of the resident populations. Any introduction of non-native invasive species can
overwhelm remaining native vegetation.
72. See Brainard, supra note 39 (discussing Pasco County, Florida).
73. See, eg., Brian D. Richter et al., How Much Water Does a River Need?,
FRESHVATER BIOLOGY (forthcoming Feb. or Mar. 1997). The crisis in the Everglades stems
in part from a similar failure to consider and maintain the natural variability in the sheetflow
which feeds that system.
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case permitting allows us to make. Ecology's insights suggest that we
should assess these costs carefully, as they may be substantial.
IV. MITIGATION AND MITIGATION BANKING
A fourth ecologically suspect attribute of our regulatory structure
is the requirement of compensatory mitigation. This section evaluates
the ecological shortcomings of current on-site mitigation practices and
the potential advantages as well as risks of employing off-site
mitigation and mitigation banks.
Under Section 404 and many state programs, applicants wishing
to place dredged or fill material in jurisdictional wetlands must follow
a sequence of steps designed to protect wetlands in the public interest.
They must demonstrate that they have sought to avoid developing in
wetlands by considering alternatives. Where this is not possible, they
must minimize the impacts on wetlands. Finally, they must mitigate
for any wetlands lost by the proposed activity.74
Compensatory mitigation is the practice by which the Corps and
EPA seek to achieve their goal of preventing net loss of wetlands
notwithstanding the very high approval rate for 404 permit applica-
tions. Three types of mitigation are generally recognized:' cre-
ation,6 restoration, 7 and preservation.7' Early efforts at mitiga-
tion through wetland on-site creation and restoration have led to very
disappointing results. An oft-cited report by Florida's Department of
Environmental Protection (DEP) found that most mitigation projects
74. See Memorandum of Agreement Between the Environmental Protection Agency
and the department of the Army Concerning the Determination of Mitigation Under the Clean
Water Act Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines (February 6, 1990) (on file with author) [hereinafter
MOA].
75. See id. at 4.
76. "CREATING wetlands means to alter upland environments or shallow aquatic
environments to produce wetlands." ENVT'L L. INST., WETLAND MITIGATION BANKING 4
(1993).
77. "RESTORING wetlands means to return wetland values and functions to a former
wetland or degraded wetland where human or natural activities have diminished or destroyed
such values and functions." I&
78. "PRESERVING wetlands means to provide legal protection to natural wetlands that
would otherwise be lost to lawful activities." Id. The MOA, supra note 74, specifies that
purchase or preservation of existing wetlands may be accepted as compensatory mitigation "in
only exceptional circumstances." ENVr'L L. INST., supra note 76, at 4. Given the Corps and
EPA's commitment to "strive to achieve a goal of no overall net loss of values and functions,"
id., this limitation makes sense. Preservation of existing wetlands in exchange for, alteration of
other wetlands seems to achieve a fifty percent loss.
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were not effective79 and some thirty-four percent were never
undertaken as required."0 Although lack of enforcement and
monitoring could be viewed as the cause of failure in the latter
category of cases, even in those cases where mitigation was undertak-
en, the failure rate was substantial and DEP's expected success rate
with remedial action was forty-one percent for freshwater sites."1
Some of the serious problems with on-site creation and restora-
tion demonstrate that newer insights from ecology are going unheed-
ed. On-site created and restored wetlands are generally fragmented
and isolated in a matrix of intense development. These are the same
ecological shortcomings that may doom wetlands "saved" by permit
denials. They signal a failure to consider the future of created and
restored wetlands at all appropriate scales and to take account of
conservation of context.
The regulatory approach to designing mitigation requirements
also evinces insufficient attention to the lessons of ecology. Whether
on- or off-site, mitigation requirements may only require the
developer to undertake certain excavation work and assure a certain
percentage cover of designated species of vegetation over a five-year
period. This focus on endpoints rather than processes may not
produce functioning wetlands. For example, a developer with a
poorly-designed created wetland may find that after a year or two, the
desired species do not survive and the area becomes overrun with
cattails. At that point, the permittee may find that it is cheaper to
weed out the undesired cattails and replant new individuals of the
unsustainable desired species periodically than to create the processes
that would ensure long-term wetland functions. This exercise may
satisfy the requirements under a permit that focuses solely on
construction and a narrow vegetation count over a defined period.
But the "wetland" may not in fact perform any of the desired
functions and may provide little or no value. Similarly, permits that
79. Noncompliance with important aspects of the permit criteria occurred at 81% of
the sites studied. DEP estimated that 27% of the sites on which mitigation efforts actually took
place were or could be ecologically successful, defined as a site functioning as or tending toward
functioning as a wetland of the intended type. The rate for success in freshwater sites was
significantly lower than for saltwater creation sites. With remedial action, DEP predicted a 76%
success rate overall for freshwater and saltwater sites. Ann M. Redmond, Florida Moves to
Mitigation Banking, NAT'L WETLANDS NEVSL. (Envt'l L. Inst., Wash., D.C.), Nov.-Dec. 1995,
at 14-15.
80. See id. at 14.
81. Id. Problems in designing hydrologic regimes were the ultimate obstacles at the
other fifty-nine percent of the sites.
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define created wetlands by endpoints fail to address the Zole that
natural processes like fire may play in the wetland's long-term
survival. By failing to include management requirements that
consider these essential processes, the mitigation effort may produce
a short-lived wetland.
The lack of attention to the broader landscape, the overlooked
role of uplands in wetlands survival, and the relatively limited number
of types of wetlands we can create are among the reasons on-site
mitigation projects often fail.' These shortcomings could be restated
in the language of current ecological thinking as: the absence of
conservation of context, the failure to consider the role of scale and
distribution of wetlands in designing mitigation,83 and the loss of
variety or heterogeneity.
There are other factors that demand close consideration in
designing requirements of both on-and off-site mitigation. The very
questions of the appropriate type of mitigation and what we mean by
net loss raise issues that pull policy in different directions. Creation
is theoretically the best way to prevent net loss, but the limitations on
our ability to create the proper soils and hydrology are constraints
that will inevitably limit our success rate in this endeavor.' There
are also limits on our technical ability to create a range of different
wetland types, thus raising the possibility of loss of variation over
time.' Finally, construction of wetlands involves the sacrifice of
uplands. This may not make sense as policy, when we look at the
broader landscape, in areas where uplands are being lost at a faster
rate than wetlands.
82. See ENVT'L L. INST., supra note 76, at 31, 34-37.
83. Successful on-site mitigation does offer the distinct advantage of retaining the
wetland function in its original location. See ENVT'L L. INST., supra note 76, at 30-31; John
Kusler, The Mitigation Banking Debate, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. (Envt'l L. Inst., Wash.,
D.C.),' Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 4.
84. See Redmond, supra note 78, at 14-15 (regarding the actual and expected success
rate of attempted sites in Florida). A mitigation ratio greater than 1:1 can eliminate or minimize
the risk of net loss by requiring the permittee to assume the risk of failure. Senate Bill 851,
considered in 1995 by the 104th Congress, addresses this problem by requiring that rules
allowing creation of wetlands as compensatory mitigation mandate that conditions be imposed
to ensure the success of the creation of the wetland. S. 851, § 3(C)(7)(B)(II). Of course, S. 851
reduces considerably the class of cases in which mitigation is required at all.
85. Senate Bill 851 addressed the related concern of loss of watershed wetland
functions through limitation of offsite compensatory mitigation in order to promote restoration
of wetland functions within the watershed to the maximum extent practicable. S. 851, § 3(C)(7)-
(B)(V).
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If we accept restoration or acquisition of existing wetlands at a
ratio of 1:1 for lost wetlands, then we are actually adopting a policy
of fifty percent loss. 6 For each acre lost, we are assured that one
acre previously subject to alteration will be protected.' We can
reduce this rate of loss by increasing the mitigation ratio, but even
with a very high ratio, substantial net loss occurs."8 In some cases,
states are tempted to go farther, by accepting restoration of degraded
wetlands already in public hands as mitigation. 9 If any wetlands are
in fact currently protected from the risk of loss, conservation lands in
public ownership should be. So restoring these wetlands enhances the
public stock of wetlands, but does not prevent loss.9"
Provisions allowing direct payment by the permittee to the
agency for mitigation credit raise a similar specter.91 In this era of
tight budgets, there will undoubtedly be pressure to spend the money
for activities that do not prevent the loss of wetlands. And state
legislators looking to trim budgets may rely on'these new funds to
justify removing dollars elsewhere from the agency's budget. These
questions of policy and priorities need to be addressed openly as we
make decisions on mitigation policy.
86. Senate Bill 851 mandates that the Corps develop standards for compensatory
mitigation that allow for enhancement or restoration of degraded wetlands and preservation or
donation of high quality wetland if the preservation or donation results in demonstrable benefit
to the watershed. See S. 851, §§ 3(C)(7)(B)(I), (III). The bill also mandates a maximum 1:1
ratio for loss of Class B wetlands, which would likely comprise the majority of existing
functioning wetlands. See S. 851, § 3(G)(1)(B)(II).
87. This assumes two things: (1) that under current law, all wetlands are subject to
development or loss through direct or indirect impacts of development; and (2) that the terms
for accepting restoration or acquisition include a requirement that the wetland be protected in
perpetuity and will in fact lead to the wetland's long-term survival. If these are not true, the
rate of net loss will be higher.
88. For example, with a mitigation of 4:1, a twenty percent net loss occurs.
89. In these times of severe budget constraints, agencies charged with environmental
stewardship are strapped for funds to manage conservation and recreation lands currently in
public ownership. These lands may contain degraded wetlands, including wetlands dominated
by non-native invasive species.
90. An exceptional case would arise where the publily-owned wetlands are at the
brink of a loss of resilience and restoration cannot be otherwise funded in time to prevent their
irreversible degradation.
91. See Lashley, supra note 70, at 21. The list of what can be accepted as mitigation
under S. 851 includes what seem to be two broad catch-all provision allowing "contribution of
in-kind intrinsic environmental value acceptable to the Secretary and otherwise authorized by
law," S. 851, § 3(C)(7)(B)(VI), and "other mitigation measures determined by the Secretary to
be appropriate in the public interest and consistent with this Act. S. 851, § 3(C)(7)(B)(IX).
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Mitigation banking has emerged in response to some of the
recognized ecological limitations of mitigation through on-site creation
or restoration. But mitigation banking itself raises concerns that must
be addressed to avoid even more problems. In mitigation banking,
the regulatory agency recognizes the creation, restoration or preserva-
tion of off-site wetlands as generating credits. These credits can then
be used as mitigation for development activity in other wetlands.9"
A carefully designed and implemented mitigation banking
program provides a vehicle for addressing some of the ecological
shortcomings of on-site mitigation. An agency which creates a bank
on a larger piece of land rather than relying on on-site creation or
restoration of smaller parcels improves the chances of preserving
wetland functions over the long-term. Further, banks can be chosen
for their connection to a matrix of preserved habitats, drawing on the
insights provided by patch dynamics. The problems of fragmentation
of habitat, resilience of the relevant systems and the need for long-
term management of the site using processes like fire can be better
addressed.
Despite their advantages, mitigation and mitigation banking° .
regimes are still vulnerable to the potential loss of local wetland
function,93 and the loss of certain wetland types.94 But well-
designed regulations can address these concerns.95
Another problem with mitigation that banking does not eliminate
is the risk that the created or restored wetland will never function or
will only function briefly. Mitigation banking programs can require
the bank to guarantee the success of the project indefinitely, requiring
the investor to act as guarantor that the ecological processes rather
than endpoints are created or restored. Under some state programs,
however, the states bear this responsibility after a limited period of
time, which may not provide the banks sufficient incentive to address
the problem encountered at many on-site mitigation projects.
92. For a detailed explanation of mitigation banking, see generally ENVr'L L. INST.,
supra note 76.
93. This potential problem is common to off-site mitigation and mitigation banking.
See Searchinger, supra note 12, at 38-39. Banking rules can address the broader concern of
watershed loss by defining a service area that limits credit from a givdn bank to those impacting
wetlands in the watershed. However, local loss is inevitable.
94. This concern can arise with all forms of mitigation.
95. For example, banking programs can require proximity measured by various criteria
and can require "in-kind" replacement. See ENVr'L LAW INST., supra note 76, at 58-59.,
96. See Lashley, supra note 71, at 20-21.
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Senate Bill 851 openly embraces mitigation banking. It orders
the Corps to develop regulations providing for mitigation banking
within one year of the bill's enactment, and it addresses some of the
important concerns that mitigation banking raises. The bill states that
"to the extent practicable and environmentally desirable," each
mitigation bank should "provide[] in-kind replacement of lost wetland
functions, and ... [be] located in, or in proximity to, the same
watershed as the affected wetland."97  Consistent with the bill's
concern for wetland functions, it mandates a system of credits based
on "scientifically sound methods" for measuring wetland function,
rather than acreage." It also mandates long-term security of
ownership interests of the bank lands,99 provides for long-term
monitoring, maintenance and protection of the bank lands,"° and
requires financial security assurances.''
CONCLUSION
It is difficult to say where the "old" ecology ended and the "new"
ecology began. Rejection of the non-equilibrium paradigm has
occurred over a period of decades and has attained the status 'of a
consensus in the last several decades. Its most prominent lesson may
be the role that disturbance regimes play in sustaining ecological
processes. But this single insight can be overstated and misapplied.
A number of other principles of perhaps equal and more profound
long-term import for environmental regulation have emerged and
these promise to provide useful direction if we heed them: the
importance of scale, resilience and process and the inevitability of
surprise as elements of natural systems.
Evaluating the federal permitting regime in light of these insights
highlights the need to treat wetlands not as objects but as natural
systems that are part of other, larger natural systems. To preserve
wetlands, we must move from the model of case-by-case permitting
of jurisdictioial wetlands to a broader resource management model
that accounts for the variability among wetlands, their dynamic
character, and the interdependence of wetlands and uplands. Ideally,
97. S. 851, § 3(N)(2)(B).
98. S. 851, § 3(N)(2)(G). This may be a tall order for current science to fill.
99. S. 851, § 3(N)(2)(F).
100. S. 851, § 3(N)(2)(E).
101. S. 851, § 3(N)(2)(C), (D).
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our regulations should protect wetland processes and functions, not
just acreage, and look at watershed and landscape scales, not just
within delineated boundaries. We can easily move in this direction,
without seeking to impose pervasive public management on private
landowners. Attention to what ecology tells us in selecting delinea-
tion criteria, in. employing and expanding watershed and regional
planning, and in approving creative mitigation strategies can .help
guide the evolution of wetlands regulation to a more successful future.
